Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums.
Introduction
In a standard stochastic control problem, the value function is well-defined and is the unique (viscosity) solution of the associated HJB equation, or the path dependent HJB equation in a path dependent setting. The existence and/or uniqueness of optimal controls often require stronger conditions (typically certain compactness and/or convexity conditions). We remark that the value exists even if there is no optimal control; additionally, when there are multiple optimal controls, they share the same value. Similar results hold for two person zero sum games under the Isaacs condition, where one may study the unique game value without requiring the existence or uniqueness of the equilibriums (saddle points). We refer to the book Mertens, Sorin, & Zamir [24] for a general exposition of the theory and Possamai, Touzi, & Zhang [29, Section 2] for a literature review on continuous time two person zero sum stochastic differential games. The situation is quite different for nonzero sum stochastic differential games. There have been many works on the existence of Nash equilibriums, by using either PDE method or BSDE method, see e.g. Bensoussan & Frehse [3] , Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet, & Rainer [4] , Cardaliaguet & Plaskacz [5] , El-Karoui & Hamadene [10] , Friedman [14] , Hamadene [15] , Hamadene, Lepeltier, & Peng [16] , Hamadene & Mannucci [17] , Hamadene & Mu [18, 19] , Lin [22] , Mannucci [25, 26] , Olsder [27] , Rainer [30] , Sun & Yong [33] , Uchida [34] , and Wu [35] , to mention a few. We emphasize that, unlike stochastic control problems or zero sum games, in the nonzero sum case different equilibriums could lead to different values, which makes it difficult to study the game value in a standard manner when there are multiple equilibriums. On the other hand, when there is no equilibrium, it becomes inconvenient even to define the game value.
We shall define the game value as the set of the values of the game over all equilibriums, which we call the set value of the game. For general set valued analysis, we refer to the book Aubin & Frankowska [2] . With the empty set as a possible set value, both the existence and uniqueness of the set value of the game is always guaranteed by definition. It turns out that this set value behaves benignly as the (real-valued) value function in stochastic control theory: it enjoys the regularity, stability, and most importantly, the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP for short) in an appropriate sense. When the set value is a singleton, e.g., in two person zero sum games or in stochastic control problems (a "game" with only one player), it reduces to a standard value function (real or vector valued) and satisfies a (path dependent) PDE. Our set value could be a candidate solution to certain set valued differential equations, which will be left for future research.
Our idea of studying the set value for nonzero sum games follows the line of, among others, Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti [1] and Sannikov [32] . Both works consider time homogeneous problems in infinite time horizon, with [1] in discrete time models and [32] in continuous time models. Another highly related work is Cardaliaguet, Quincampoix, & Saint-Pierre [6] , which uses viability theory. The main focus of [6] is the numerical approximation for the set of initial states satisfying some required properties, while we focus on the dynamic set of the values of the game.
In Section 2 we revisit the discrete time model, but with finite horizon. Besides establishing the DPP as in [1] , which was called factorization and self-generation there, our main contribution is to show that, even in the state dependent (or say, Markovian) setting, the DPP would fail if one restricts to state dependent equilibriums. Consequently it is necessary to consider path dependent controls in order to have the DPP, which is not the case for stochastic control problems and zero sum games and is due to the non-uniqueness of the values (though the set of values is always unique). While already studied in the literature in various contexts, we also show that DPP would fail if we restrict to Pareto optimal equilibriums and discuss how to choose an "optimal" equilibrium by introducing a central planner. Another highly relevant problem, although not discussed in this paper, is to estimate the model parameters with the presence of multiple equilibriums, for which we refer to the survey paper Ho & Rosen [20, Section 2] and the references therein. We shall also remark that, as already observed in Pham & Zhang [28] , through Buckdahn's counterexample for zero sum games, to ensure the DPP for the game value we need to consider closed loop controls rather than open loop controls.
In Section 3 we study our main object: a continuous time model in a path dependent setting. Sannikov [32] studied a special game in infinite horizon, where the set value of the game is time invariant. The main focus of [32] is the characterization and geometric properties of the set value (a fixed set in R N ) as well as its economic implications. We shall study the dynamic set value systematically in a finite time horizon. In our general model, it is difficult to study the true equilibriums. Motivated by [4] and [24, VII.4] , we relax the set value of the game to the limit of the value sets over all ε-equilibriums. Then the set value will be compact and will be nonempty as long as there exist ε-equilibriums for all ε > 0, which is a much weaker requirement than the existence of true equilibriums (see e.g. Frei & dos Reis [13] for an example) and is sufficient for practical purpose in most applications. This is exactly in the spirit of the stochastic control problems, where the value is the limit of the values over ε-optimal controls. We believe this approach of the values could be efficient in more general control/game problems where the optimal control/equilibrium is hard to analyze.
Our next result is the regularity (sensitivity with respect to the state process) and stability (sensitivity with respect to the coefficients) of the set value, under mild regularity assumptions on the coefficients. These results have fundamental importance in applications.
As a consequence we obtain the measurability of the set value in terms of the state, without invoking the subtle arguments involving analytic sets. Our result is in the direction of Feinstein [11] , except that [11] studies the set of the equilibriums instead of the values.
The main result of this paper is the DPP for the set value, which can be viewed as a type of time consistency and justifies that the set value is an appropriate object for our dynamic model. While natural in light of its counterpart in the discrete model, the result is more involved in the continuous time model and requires several approximations. The pathwise setting adds the technical difficulty. As already observed in Section 2, the pathwise structure is intrinsically needed even in the state dependent setting.
Finally we provide a duality result, motivated by Ma & Yong [23] and Karnam, Ma, & Zhang [21] . We introduce an auxiliary control problem on an enlarged state space, where the additional state corresponds to the possible values of the game. The value function of the new control problem is a viscosity solution of a standard path dependent HJB equation, for which we refer to Ekren, Touzi, & Zhang [8, 9] , and Ren, Touzi, & Zhang [31] . Then the set value of the game is characterized as the nodal set of this new value function. This approach is related to the viability approach in [6] and is quite efficient in terms of numerical computation of the set value.
The discrete model
In this section we study a discrete model with finite time horizon, introduced in Section 2.2.
The DPP for the set value is similar to Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti [1] and is presented in Section 2.3. The results in Section 2.4 concerning the state dependent case is new, to the best of our knowledge. The observations in Sections 2.1, 2.5, and 2.6 are interesting but not surprising in the game literature. We nevertheless present them here because the same properties hold in the continuous time model in the next section, but it is easier for the readers to include them in this section.
A static game
In this subsection we consider a simple static game with N players, and present some basic observations about Nash equilibriums. Player i's control takes values in a measurable set A i . For a = (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ A := A 1 × · · · × A N , J i (a) is the player i's cost function, and J := (J 1 , · · · , J N ) : A → R N . We say a * ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if:
where (a * ,−i , a i ) is the same as a * except that its i-th component is replaced by a i .
Note that there might be multiple equilibriums or no equilibriums. We emphasize that the non-zero sum game could have different values J(a * ) at different equilibriums a * , as we see in Example 2.1 below. We thus introduce the set value of the game:
V := J(a * ) : for all equilibriums a * ⊂ R N .
, and J(a) as in Table 1 below. Then the game has two equilibriums a * = (0, 0) and a * = (1, 1), and the set value is V = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
J(a)
a 1 = 0 a 1 = 1 a 2 = 0 (0, 1) (3, 3) Table 2 , then clearly there is a unique equilibrium a * = (1, 1) with value J(a * ) = (3, 3). However, we note that J i (0, 0) = 1 < 3 = J i (a * ) for both i = 1, 2.
(ii) In general the comparison principle does not hold for the game value. Consider thẽ J in the right side of Table 2 . There is a unique equilibriumã * = (0, 0) with valuẽ J(ã * ) = (2, 2). Note that J i (a) <J i (a) for all a ∈ A and i = 1, 2, but J i (a * ) = 3 > 2 =J i (ã * ) for both i = 1, 2.
The set value in a dynamic setting
We now consider a dynamic setting. In this section we assume both the time and the state are discrete. Let (Ω, F) be a fixed measurable space, T := {0, 1, · · · , T } denotes the set of discrete times. For each t ∈ T, S t is the set of discrete states at t with |S t | < ∞, and X t : Ω → S t the canonical process. For the reason we will explain in Subsection 2.4 below, we shall consider a path dependent setting:
Throughout this section, all the time dependent functions ϕ will be required to be adapted in the sense that ϕ(t, x) depends only on (t, x 0 , · · · , x t ). We shall denote
There are N players, where the admissible control of the i-th player is
x, a; ·) : S t+1 → (0, 1] is the transition probability function: x∈S t+1 q(t, x, a; x) = 1. Let P t,x,α denote the probability measure such that: Theorem 2.7 For any (t, x) ∈ T × S T and T 0 > t, V(t, x) = J(T 0 , ψ; t, x, α * ) : for all ψ and α * satisfying
t,x , and α * ∈ N E(T 0 , ψ; t, x) .
(2.1)
Proof LetṼ(t, x) denote the right side of (2.1).
Now for any i and
Note that q > 0 and thus P t,x,α * (X = T 0x ) > 0. This implies that α * ∈ N E(T 0 ,x), then ψ(x) ∈ V(T 0 ,x). Therefore, it follows from (2.1) that y ∈Ṽ(t, x).
(ii) On the other hand, let y = J(T 0 , ψ; t, x, α * ) ∈Ṽ(t, x) for some desired ψ and α * . For eachx ∈ S T t,x , we have ψ(x) ∈ V(T 0 ,x) and thus there exists α *
Then, for any i and any
This implies thatα * ∈ N E(t, x), and thus y = J i (t, x,α * ) ∈ V(t, x).
Remark 2.8
The condition q > 0, which implies that P t,x,α are all equivalent for different α, seems crucial in the proof of Theorem 2.7. This condition is also used in [1] and is interpreted as that no player can infer the other players' controls through the observed state process.
When q is only required to be nonnegative, we can prove the partial DPP:
x) denotes the right side of (2.1). It will be interesting to see if the DPP (or its appropriate variation) still holds true when the measures are singular. Remark 2.10 Motivated by the mean field equilibriums, we call an equilibrium α * at (t, x)
Then following the same arguments V symmetric also satisfies DPP:
x, α * ) : for all ψ and α * such that α * is a symmetric equilibrium at (T 0 , ψ; t, x) and ψ(x) ∈ V symmetric (T 0 ,x) for allx ∈ S T t,x .
The state dependent case
In this subsection we consider a state dependent (i.e., Markovian) model:
and in this case it is natural to abuse the notation and denote it as ϕ(t, x t ).
We first remark that, in this case we may still have path dependent equilibriums, whose value is different from those of state dependent equilibriums.
, and S T takes values as in Figure 1 . That is,
For the first two periods and for g, we set
Then the game at (0, s 0 ) does not depend on α(0, ·) and α(1, ·). Indeed, J(0, s 0 , α) = 1 2 J (α(2, (s 0 , s 10 , s 2 ))) +J(α(2, (s 0 , s 11 , s 2 ))) ,
Let us assume that the game forJ(a), which corresponds to the last period of the original game, has two equilibriums a * andã * . Then we may construct a path dependent equilibrium:
noting that X 0 ≡ s 0 and X 2 ≡ s 2 are deterministic,
For this purpose, we set f (2, s 2 , a) and q(2, s 2 , a; s 30 ) for a ∈ A as in Table 3 . Then by (2.4) we see that 4J is the same as Table 1 , and thus there are two equilibriums a * = (0, 0) with values (0, 1 4 ) and ( 1 4 , 0). However, we can construct a path dependent equilibrium α * by (2.5), whose corresponding value is:
In view of Example 2.11, nevertheless, V is still state dependent if we restrict to the state dependent model (2.3).
. Such correspondence is one to one and thus it is clear that
From now on, in the state dependent case, we may write the set value as V(t, x). The following DPP is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.7. 
We emphasize that, although our model is state dependent here, the DPP above involves path dependent ψ and α * . In fact, if we restrict to state dependent functions ψ and/or α * , then the DPP may fail, as we explain next.
We first investigate the case that ψ is state dependent but α * can be still path dependent.
In this case by Corollary 2.13 the following partial DPP is obvious:
(2.6) However, the above inclusion can be strict.
Example 2.14 Consider Example 2.11 and set T 0 = 2. By Example 2.11, we see that
If ψ is state dependent, then there are only two possible functions: ψ 1 (s 2 ) = (0, 1 4 ) and ψ 2 (s 2 ) = ( 1 4 , 0) . Recalling that f (0, ·) = f (1, ·) = 0, then J(T 0 , ψ; 0, s 0 , α) = ψ(s 2 ) for all α. Thus the right side of (2.6) is (0, 1 4 ), ( 1 4 , 0) . However, by Example 2.11 we know that V(0, s 0 ) contains at least one other value ( 1 8 , 1 8 ).
We next investigate the case that both ψ and α ∈ A are state dependent, then obviously J(t, x, α) and J(T 0 , ψ; t, x, α) are also state dependent. Define
We emphasize that here all controls are required to be state dependent, in particular, 
but the inclusion could be strict.
We remark that the inclusions in (2.6) and (2.7) have opposite directions.
Proof LetṼ state (t, x) denote the right side of (2.7). We shall prove V state ⊂Ṽ state , and see Example 2.16 below that V state =Ṽ state . We follow the arguments in Theorem 2.7 (i) and proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Let α * ∈ A state be an equilibrium in A state at (t, x). Denote
For any i and
Then following the same arguments as in Theorem 2.7 ((i)) we see that α * is an equilibrium in A state at (T 0 , ψ; t, x).
Step 2. It remains to show that ψ(x) ∈ V state (T 0 ,x) for allx ∈ S T 0 . That is,
We emphasize that theα i constructed in (2.2) is not in A state,i , even when α * and α i there are state dependent, so a more careful argument is required. We shall prove (2.8) by backward induction on T 0 .
First, if T 0 = T − 1, then the counterpart of (2.2) becomes: for any fixedx ∈ S T 0 ,
which is state dependent. Then (2.8) follows from the same arguments in Theorem 2.7 ((i)).
Assume (2.8) holds true for T 0 + 1. Now for T 0 , note that
where the last inequality is thanks to the induction assumption. Fixx ∈ S T 0 and definê
which is again state dependent. Then, denoting P t,x,α in the obvious way,
Note that P t,x,α * (X T 0 =x) > 0. Then, together with (2.9), the above implies
This proves (2.8), hence (2.7).
We now construct a counterexample such that the inclusion in (2.7) is strict. This is again due to the nonuniqueness of equilibriums.
, and S T takes values as in Figure 2 .
We shall construct an equilibrium whose value is inṼ state (0, s 0 )\V state (0, s 0 ). Set
Given a desired ψ, for any α ∈ A state , clearly J(1, ψ; 0, s 0 , α) = Note that V state (1, s 10 ) and V state (1, s 11 ) are two different three-period games. Let the (3period) subgames at branch X 1 = s 10 and at branch X 1 = s 11 exactly as in Example 2.11.
Since we consider only α ∈ A state , by (2.4) we have
Then, by Example 2.11, 
.
On the other hand, since q(0, ·) = 1 2 and f (0, ·) = 0, for any α ∈ A state we have J(0, s 0 , α) = So V state (0, s 0 ) = {(0, 1 4 ), ( 1 4 , 0)}, therefore, ( 1 8 , 1 8 ) ∈Ṽ state (0, s 0 )\V state (0, s 0 ).
Pareto equilibriums
For y,ỹ ∈ R N . We say y ≤ỹ if y i ≤ỹ i for i = 1, · · · , N , and y <ỹ if we assume further that y i <ỹ i for some i. As we saw in Remark 2.3((ii)), for a non-zero sum game typically the comparison principle fails in the sense:
for equilibriums α * ,α * for games J,J respectively.
A consequence of the above property is that DPP would fail, in general, if one restricts to the so called Pareto equilibriums. As the following example show, even the partial DPPs fail in general:
x, α * ) : for all ψ and α * such that
x , and α * is a Pareto equilibrium at (T 0 , ψ; t, x) .
(2.11) Example 2.18 As usual letṼ P areto (t, x) denote the right side of (2.11). Let T = 2, N = 2,
, and S T takes values as in Figure 3 . Then J(1, x, a) := J(1, (s 0 , x), a) are as in Table 5 . This implies that
where ψ * andψ * are given in Table 6 .
J(1, s 10 , a) a 1 = 0 a 1 = 1 a 2 = 0 (3, 3) (4, 4)
J(1, s 11 , a) a 1 = 0 a 1 = 1 a 2 = 0 (6, 6) (11, 7) a 2 = 1 (11, 7) (1, 5)
J(1, s 12 , a) a 1 = 0 a 1 = 1 a 2 = 0 (6, 6) (7, 11) a 2 = 1 (7, 11) (5, 1)
J(1, s 11 , a) a 1 = 0 a 1 = 1 a 2 = 0 (7, 7) (10, 10) a 2 = 1 (10, 10) (4, 4) do not include each other, namely partial DPP fails in both directions.
Remark 2.19
We emphasize that in Definition 2.17 a Pareto equilibrium α * is only compared to other equilibriums. In general it is possible that there exists another control α ∈ A (not an equilibrium) such that J(t, x, α) < J(t, x, α * ), see Remark 2.3 (i) . We may call an equilibrium α * ∈ A a strong Pareto equilibrium if there is no such control α ∈ A. Denote In general DPP fails for V strong P areto too.
Optimal equilibriums
We now fix x 0 ∈ S 0 and consider V(0, x 0 ). In practice it is important to determine which equilibrium to implement. For this purpose we introduce a central planner, and assume the central planner is interested in minimizing:
Such problems are natural, say, for social welfares. By Proposition 2.6, the problem (2.12) has an optimizer y * ∈ V(0, x 0 ), and correspondingly there exists α * ∈ N E(0, x 0 ). Note that, when λ i > 0 for all i, such α * is automatically a Pareto equilibrium. We remark that in general neither y * nor α * is unique, however, the central planer is indifferent to them and thus can pick an arbitrary one. More importantly, in practice it is quite easy to implement such an equilibrium, as we explain below. Remark 2.20 (i) Assume the central planner picks an optimal equilibrium α * . He can simply recommend it to the players. As long as each player believes the others would follow the recommended one, it is in his/her best interest to follow the same α * since it is an equilibrium. Moreover, since α * is a Pareto optimal one (assuming λ i > 0 for all i), the players are unlikely to make a collective decision to choose a different equilibrium.
(ii) The problem is quite different from a "dictatorship" scenario, where the dictator wants to minimizeṼ
Assume the problemṼ 0 has an optimal argumentα * and the dictator forces the players to follow it. However, sinceα * is (in general) not an equilibrium, the individual players have no incentive to follow it even if they believe the others would do so. Consequently, the dictator has to use regulation/penalty (or similar) to force them to implement this strategy, which adds to the social cost.
Remark 2.21
Since DPP fails for the Pareto equilibriums as detailed in Section 2.5, the dynamic version of (2.12) will generally be time inconsistent. In particular, this implies that there need not, and typically will not, exist a moving scalarization (a moving objective parameterized by an adapted process λ) as in Feinstein & Rudloff [12] so that α * is a consistent equilibrium for this problem. Time inconsistency, therefore, implies that though a central planner may dictate a socially beneficial equilibrium at time 0, at some time t this may no longer be the optimal equilibrium.
The continuous time model
In this section we extend our results to a continuous time setting. We shall consider a diffusion model with drift controls only. In this case all the involved probability measures are equivalent. The case with volatility controls may require new insights, especially in light of Remark 2.8, and is left for future research.
The nonzero sum game
Let [0, T ] be the time horizon, (Ω, F = {F t } 0≤t≤T , P 0 ) a filtered probability space, B a ddimensional P 0 -Brownian motion. Consider a game with N players. Let A = A 1 × · · · × A N be the set of control values in appropriate Euclidean spaces, and A = A 1 × · · · × A N the set of F-progressively measurable A-valued processes. The data of the game satisfy the following basic properties, where the boundedness assumption is mainly for simplicity. At time t, each player has the value defined through the conditional expectation:
We say α * ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium at t if
s. for all i and all α i ∈ A i , and we introduce the set value:
V t := J(t, α * ) : for all Nash equilibrium α * at t .
We remark that the elements of V t are F t -measurable R N -valued random variables, and we shall consider the localization in R N in the next subsection.
and we define Nash equilibrium at (T 0 , η; t) in the obvious way. As such we then have the following DPP. Proof LetṼ t denote the right side of (3.1). First, for J(t, , α * ) ∈ V t , denote η := J(T 0 , α * ).
. It is clear that
That is, α * is a Nash equilibrium at (T 0 , η; t). Moreover, assume by contradiction that η / ∈ V T 0 , then there exist i and
The second term above is nonnegative by the requirement of α * . Moreover, note that
. So α * is an equilibrium at t, and thus J(T 0 , η; t, α * ) = J(t,α * ) ∈ V t .
The localization
While Theorem 3.2 is quite simple, as mentioned V t is a set of random variables, rather than value sets in R N as in Section 2, which is not desirable in applications. In this subsection we localize the random variables in a pointwise sense. For this purpose it is more convenient to use the canonical space.
Let 
We say α * ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium at (t, ω), denoted as α * ∈ N E(t, ω), if
and we introduce the set value:
Intuitively, η ∈ V t means η(ω) ∈ V 0 (t, ω) for P 0 -a.e. ω. However, the rigorous treatment is quite involved here. Since the state space Ω is uncountable, the measurability or even certain regularity of the set value will be required. Note that A is typically not compact, so the arguments in Proposition 2.6 do not work here. In fact, in this case neither the (Borel) measurability of the set V 0 (t, ω) ⊂ R N for fixed (t, ω) nor the F t -measurability of the mapping ω → V 0 (t, ω) is clear to us. In the literature (usually in discrete models), see e.g. Mertens, Sorin, & Zamir [6] , typically one needs to invoke the analytic sets to study the measurability. To avoid these subtle arguments and to obtain the desired properties, we relax the equilibriums to approximating ones, which are typically sufficient in practice.
Clearly V 0 (t, ω) ⊂ V(t, ω). Moreover, we have the following simple but important properties. (ii) For any ε ′ < ε, the closure cl(V ε ′ (t, ω)) ⊂ V ε (t, ω);
Proof (i) This result is obvious.
(ii) One can easily see that cl ω) ) is also compact. Moreover, again since each cl(V ε (t, ω)) is compact, we see that V(t, ω) = ∅ whenever cl(V ε (t, ω)) = ∅ for all ε > 0.
Remark 3.5 It is obvious that cl(V 0 (t, ω)) ⊂ V(t, ω), however, the inclusion could be strict.
Note that V 0 (t, ω) = ∅ if and only if the game has a true equilibrium, while V(t, ω) = ∅ can occur even if no equilibriums exist. Such a relaxation could be useful for more general games where a true equilibrium may not exist, see e.g., Frei & dos Reis [13] , Buckdahn,
Cardaliaguet, & Rainer [4] , and Lin [22] for some results in this direction (the latter two use strategies instead of closed-loop controls though).
However, we still have difficulty to obtain the F t -measurability of the mappings ω → V ε (t, ω). To get around of this difficulty, we introducê
It is clear that
For the rest of the properties, we impose the following regularities. (ii) b, f are uniformly continuous in a.
We then have the F t -measurability in the following sense.
Proposition 3.7 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 (i) hold. For any t, ε and any η ∈ L 0 (F t ),
Consequently, the event {ω ∈ Ω :
Proof We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. Note that
One can easily see that there exists a modulus of continuity function ρ such that
Step 2. We show that, for any ε 1 < ε 2 and (t, ω), there exists δ > 0 such that 
Choose δ > 0 small enough such that 2ρ(δ) ≤ ε 2 − ε 1 , we see that α ε 1 ∈ N E ε 2 (t, ω).
Moreover, by (3.3) again we have
So y ∈ V ε 2 (t, ω).
Step 3. We show that, for any compact set K ⊂ R N , the event {ω ∈ Ω :
is open (in terms of ω under · ), and thus is obviously F t -measurable. Indeed, fix ω such
open and increasing in ε ′ , there exists ε 1 < ε such that K ⊂ V ε 1 (t, ω). Now by (3.4) we see that there exists δ > 0 such that K ⊂ V ε 1 +ε
Step 4. We now prove the desired measurability. Note that the set of closed balls in R N with rational centers and rational radii is countable, numerated as
is open, one can easily verify that
Clearly {η ∈ K i } is F t -measurable, and by Step 3 the events E i are also F t -measurable, then so is the event {ω : η(ω) ∈V ε (t, ω)}. Finally, note that {ω : η(ω) ∈ V(t, ω)} = n≥1 {ω :
We next establish the regularity and stability of V in the spirit of Feinstein [11] . However, we note that [11] considers the set of equilibriums, while we consider the set of values. Given That is, the limit inferior (superior) denotes the set of y ∈ R N such that there exist y n ∈ D n (resp. subsequence) satisfying lim n→∞ y n = y. Theorem 3.8 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 ((i)) hold.
(ii) Assume (b n , f n , ξ n ) satisfy Assumption 3.6 uniformly and define V n ε (t, ω) in the obvious way. If (b n , f n , ξ n ) → (b, f, ξ) uniformly, then
Proof (i) Denote δ n := ω n t∧· − ω t∧· → 0. For any ε 1 < ε 2 , by (3.4) we see that
Now fix ε 2 and set ρ(δ n ) ≤ ε 2 4 , we see that (3.5) holds for all ε 1 ≤ ε 2 2 . This implies im-
Since the limit inferior is always contained in the limit superior, hence they are all equal.
(ii) Let J n be defined by (3.2) , but corresponding to (b n , f n , ξ n ). It is clear that c n := sup t,ω,α |[J n − J](t, ω, α)| → 0. Then the result follows similar arguments to (i).
Dynamic programming principle
Given T 0 ∈ (0, T ] and η ∈ L ∞ (F T 0 ; R N ), one may consider the game on [0, T 0 ] with terminal condition η. In particular,
and we can define equilibrium and ε-equilibrium at (T 0 , η; t, ω) in the obvious sense. Our main result of this section is the following theorem. such that α ε ∈ N E ε (T 0 , η; t, ω) and P 0 (η t,ω / ∈V ε (T 0 , B t,ω · )) ≤ ε .
(3.7)
To prove the theorem, we first need a lemma. The proof follows the same approximations in Zhang [36, Theorem 2.5.2] Steps 1-4, and we omit the details. Proof of Theorem 3.9. For notational simplicity, we assume t = 0, then (3.7) becomes:
(3.9) (i) We first prove the ⊂ part. Fix y ∈ V(0, 0) and ε > 0. Let δ ∈ (0, ε] be a small number which will be specified later. Since y ∈ V δ (0, 0), there exists α δ ∈ N E δ (0, 0) such that |y − J(0, 0, α δ )| ≤ δ. For any δ 1 > 0, apply Lemma 3.10 (ii) on α δ , there exists a desired approximationα δ ∈ A such thatα δ is uniformly continuous in ω and
By Assumption 3.6 (ii) and (3.2), for δ 1 small enough we see thatα δ ∈ N E 2δ (0, 0) and |y − J(0, 0,α δ )| ≤ 2δ. Define η(ω) := J(T 0 , ω, (α δ ) T 0 ,ω ) and let η δ , E δ satisfy (3.8) for the same δ.
(3.10)
Note that, for any α ∈ A,
Then clearlyα δ ∈ N E 2δ (T 0 , η, 0, 0). Moreover, by (3.6) and (3.8) one can easily see that J(T 0 , η δ ; 0, 0, α) − J(T 0 , η; 0, 0, α) ≤ C √ δ, then, for a possibly larger C,α δ ∈ N E C √ δ (T 0 , η δ , 0, 0) and |y − J(T 0 , η δ ; 0, 0,α δ )| ≤ C √ δ. We shall always assume C √ δ ≤ ε, thenα δ ∈ N E ε (T 0 , η δ , 0, 0) and y ∈ O ε (J(T 0 , η δ ; 0, 0,α δ )).
It remains to verify P 0 {ω : η δ (ω) / ∈V ε (T 0 , ω)} ≤ ε. Since we are usingV ε instead of V ε , we fix another ε 1 < ε and assume C √ δ ≤ ε 1 . Recall (3.8) for E δ and consider
, and for i ≥ 1,
For each i and ω ∈ E i , we have
Since Ω is separable, for any δ 2 > 0, we may write
Since η δ ,α δ , and J are uniformly continuous in ω, then for δ 2 small enough we have
This implies further that
Then
Thus, recalling thatα δ ∈ N E 2δ (0, 0),
This implies that
Then, for δ small enough, by (3.11) we have
This proves that y ∈Ṽ ε (0, 0), and by the arbitrariness of ε, y ∈Ṽ(0, 0).
(ii) To see the opposite inclusion, we fix y ∈Ṽ(0, 0) and ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be a small number which will be specified later. Since y ∈Ṽ δ (0, 0), let η, α δ be the corresponding terms in (3.9) corresponding to δ. Moreover, let η δ , E δ be as in Lemma 3.10 (i). Denotẽ
Since Ω is separable, for any δ 3 > 0, we may writeẼ δ :
on E δ , and η δ , J are uniformly continuous in ω, for δ 3 small enough, we havẽ α j ∈ N E Cδ (T 0 , ω) and |η(ω) − J(T 0 , ω,α j )| ≤ Cδ for all ω ∈Ẽ j .
Fix an arbitraryα 0 ∈ A, and definê
Moreover, for any i and α i ∈ A i , denotê
Then J i (0, 0,α δ ) − J i (0, 0,α δ,−i , α i ) = I 1 + I 2 , where
Note that
Then, for δ small enough such that C √ δ ≤ ε,
That is,α δ ∈ N E ε (0, 0). Moreover,
So y ∈ V ε (0, 0), and since ε is arbitrary, we obtain y ∈ V(0, 0).
Remark 3.11
In the state dependent setting, namely
as in Subsection 2.4 we can show that V(t, ω) = V(t, ω t ) is also state dependent, but the DPP still involves path dependent η and α ε .
A duality result
In this subsection we provide an alternative characterization for the set value V(t, ω We first note that, for any (t, ω) and α ∈ A, J(t, ω, α) = Y t,ω,α For each i and a −i = (a 1 , · · · , a i−1 , a i+1 , · · · , a N ), denote
Fix (t, ω) and y ∈ R N . For any α ∈ A and Z = (Z 1 , · · · , Z N ), denote We then introduce an auxiliary control problem: Here the power 3 2 (between 1 and 2) for the f term is for some technical reasons on which we elaborate later.
Note that (3.14) is a standard path dependent control problem. Following Zhang [36, Section 11.3.3] we have the following result whose proof is omitted. , and we refer to Zhang [36, Section 9.4] for more details. Note that this path dependent PDE is always degenerate and the control is unbounded, so the uniqueness of viscosity solution is not completely covered in Ekren, Touzi, & Zhang [8, 9] and Ren, Touzi, & Zhang [31] . This problem is in general challenging and is left for future research. This PDE is also degenerate and with unbounded controls though.
Our main result of this subsection is that the set value agrees with the nodal set of W . Proof Without loss of generality, we assume (t, ω) = (0, 0), and for notational simplicity we may omit (0, 0) when there is no confusion, for example J(α) := J(0, 0, α). We note that, since b is bounded, for any p ≥ 1,
(ii) We next show that V(0, 0) ⊂ N(0, 0). Fix y ∈ V(0, 0). For any ε > 0, there exists α ε ∈ N E ε (0, 0) such that |y − J(α ε )| ≤ ε. Recall that J(α ε ) = Y α ε 0 , where (Y α ε , Z α ε ) is defined by (3.12) . Let (Ŷ ε ,Ẑ ε ) be defined by (3.19) . For each i, there exists α i such that f i (r, B, α Since ξ and f are bounded, by standard BSDE estimates we have E P 0 T 0 |Ẑ ε,i s | 2 ds ≤ C. Note further that Then, by (3.14) we have W (0, 0, y) ≤ N ρ(ε). Since ε is arbitrary, we get W (0, 0, y) = 0, that is, y ∈ N(0, 0).
Remark 3.15
Roughly speaking (modulus the existence of optimal controls in (3.14)), y is in the nodal set N (t, ω) if and only if there exists α, Z such that Y t,ω,y,α,Z in (3.13) hits the target ξ t,ω (B) at T − t. This is in the spirit of Cardaliaguet, Quincampoix, & Saint-Pierre [6] . However, we note that [6] uses strategy versus controls, while we use closed-loop controls for all players.
